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In 1985, nonbank U.S. multinational companies employed 24.5 million
workers, had worldwide sales of almost $3.5 trillion, and net income of
$150 billion on assets of $4.2 trillion. The foreign (non-U.S.) affiliates of
these companies had 6.4 million employees, $900 billion of those sales, and
$43 billion of net income, with assets of $838 billion. United States
multinationals accounted for roughly three-quarters of total American
merchandise exports in 1985 and half of total imports, with approximately
40 percent of each category arising from transfers within U.S. multination-
als between American parent firms and their own foreign affiliates.1 And
1985 is widely regarded as a sluggish year for U.S. multinationals.
By any measure, U.S. multinationals play an important role in the world
economy. Yet multinational corporations operate in economic and legal
environments that are often extremely complex and subject to abrupt
changes. Volatility in exchange rates is one recent example of such changes;
the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) is another. The recent U.S.tax
change seems likely to have a considerable effecton the net earnings U.S.
multinationals can expect to get abroad.
This paper was prepared for presentation at the NBER Tax Policy and the Economy
Conference, Washington, D. C., November 1987. I am grateful to Mark Gersovitz, Gene
Grossman, David Hartman, Joosung Jun. Scott Newlon, James Poterba, Harvey Rosen,
Lawrence Summers, and especially Daniel Frisch for helpful comments and to David Andres
and Joseph Marucci of Price Waterhouse-Princeton for data they provided.
1Data on U.S. multinationals in 1985 is reported in Brereton (1987).34Hines
This chapter analyzes the impact of the U.S. tax system on overseas
investments of U.S. multinationals. The TRA is just the most recentin a
series of significant changes over the last twenty-five years inthe U.S. tax
law that applies to the foreign earnings of U.S. companies.The issue of
U.S. tax incentives for overseas investments arises time and againin policy
debates in the United States, as the goals of domestic employment and
competitiveness in foreign markets compete with each other for legislative
support. There is a widely held view that the U.S. tax system encourages
American companies to invest excessively abroad, thereby depriving this
country of capital, jobs, and productivity growth. Howeverdesirable it may
be to encourage U.S. companies to invest their capital abroad, there
appears to be little in the way of hard analysisof current and past incentives
provided by the U.S. tax system. This chapter argues that the U.S. tax
system has served to discourage foreign investment by U.S.multinationals
more than is widely believed, but that the TRAhas substantially reduced
this negative incentive.
Section 1 examines some of the striking effects that foreign country tax
systems have had on U.S. multinational activity. Section 2describes the
method by which the United States taxes the foreign income of its
multinationals, and some of the theoretical implications of this system.
Section 3 presents and analyzes recent data on U.S. and foreign tax
collections from U.S. multinationals. Section 4 examines the financial
behavior of U.S. multinationals and its tax consequences. Section 5 pres-
ents new estimates of effective tax rates on U.S. multinationalinvestments
in selected countries and considers recent investment behavior in the light
of these estimates. Section 6 is the conclusion.
1. TAX HAVENS AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY
Foreign countries are free to choose whatever tax regimes they want to
impose on multinationals operating within their boundaries. Not surpris-
ingly, tax rates vary widely from one countly to another. In addition, many
countries have signed bilateral tax treaties with other countries providing
for mutual special tax treatment of the income from each others' multina-
tional investments.
Tax havens are countries with very low rates of taxation of foreign
investment. The governments of these countries are presumably willing to
sacrifice some potential tax revenue in return for the employment, tech-
nology, and capital that foreign multinationals can provide. For U.S. firms
investing overseas, the most important tax havens include the Bahamas,
the Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, Panama, Hong Kong, Liberia, Luxem-
bourg, and Switzerland. By offering very low tax rates to induce foreignTaxation and U. S. Multinational Investment35
TABLE 1
Tax Havens and U.S. Multinationals, 1982
Note: Dollar amounts are millions of current (1982) dollars.
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury (1985).
investment, these countries provide a simple ifiustration of the ability of
taxes to affect economic behavior.
Table 1 reports the taxable activity of U.S. multinationals in tax havens in
1982. A quick glance at the level of U.S. multinational earnings in the
Bahamas, the Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, and Panama is enough to
suggest the conclusion that something, most likely favorable tax treatment,
is inducing U.S. multinationals to concentrate an inordinate share of their
income production in tax havens.2 And since (as wifi be discussed shortly)
the tax law discourages U.S. multinationals with operations in low-tax
countries from taking actions that make their foreign source income
taxable, the true foreign source income generated in these tax havens is
quite likely to be greater than the reported figures.
The common wisdom in government and industry circles is that U.S.
multinationals have over the last twenty years become increasingly adept at
planning their overseas investment and financing activity in order to
minimize tax obligations. All other things equal, one obvious way to avoid
taxes is to locate as much foreign income production as possible in tax
havens. Of course, there may be more geographical discretion insome
industries than in others. Table 2 explores recent trends in tax haven
activity of U.S. multinationals. The tax haven fraction of worldwide pretax
earnings of the controlled foreign corporations of U.S. multinationals rose
from 11 to 20 percent over the period 1968-1982. As the table suggests, this
use rise is largely attributable to a greater fraction of U.S. multinational
profits coming from the wholesale trade and finance, insurance, and real
2Strictly speaking, U.S. multinationals report inordinate earnings in tax havens. How much of












Country income GNP GNP taxes (%)
Bahamas $ 2,222 $840 264.5 $40 1.8
Netherlands Antilles 1,152 1,370 84.1 196 17.0
Bermuda 552 790 69.9 3 0.5
Panama 1,259 4,060 31.0 239 19.0
All countries 57,059- 0.8 21,998 38.636Hines
TABLE 2
Growth of Tax Haven Activity By Controlled Foreign Corporations of
U.S. Multinationals 1968-1982
Earnings before tax f CFCs
All industries 1968 $855 $7,744 11.0
1972 1,972 15,356 12.8
1980 6,681 47,622 14.0
1982 7,405 36,696 20.2
Finance, insurance, and real estate1968 109 358 30.4
1972 422 1,190 35.5
1980 2,048 4,822 42.5
Wholesale trade 1968 285 1,323 21.5
1972 731 2,141 34.1
1980 2,220 9,890 22.4
Services 1968 34 117 19.2
1972 113 589 19.2
1980 365 1,841 19.8
Other industries 1968 427 5,886 7.3
1972 706 1,436 6.2
1980 2,048 31,069 6.6
Note: Dollar amounts are millions of current dollars. The following constitute the tax havens: the
Bahamas, the Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, Panama, Hong Kong, Liberia, Luxembourg, and
Switzerland.
Source. States (1986-1987). Detailed industry earnings are not available by country for 1982.
estate industries, which have proclivities for tax haven locations.Indeed,
the rising importance of these industries may in part be due to their abifity
to locate in low-tax countries.
The casual evidence from tax havens is consistent with the view that
foreign tax systems influence the investment decisions of U.S. multination-
als, and that this influence is growing. For those interested in American tax
policy, the next question is to what extent the U.S. tax code affects the
overseas investment decisions of our multinationals.In order to address
that question, it is necessary to consider in detail some of the provisions of
the code as they affect the taxation of foreign source income.
2. THE TAX SYSTEM
The tax treatment of income generated by overseas investments of U.S.
multinational corporations is extremely complicated. This section contains
In tax
In tax In all havens
Industry of CFCs Yearhavenscountries (%)Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment37
a brief description of some of its primary features. To begin with, the
United States uses a "residence" standard to tax itscorporations, which
means that U.S. corporations owe tax to the U.S. Treasuryon all of their
worldwide income, wherever earned. (The alternativesystem would be
one of "territorial" taxation, under which the U.S. would tax only that
corporate income actually earned in the United States and would nottax at
all the offshore earnings of U.S. corporations. A numberof European
countries, including France and the Netherlands,use territorial-type tax
systems.)
Thus, when U.S. multinationalsearn profits in other countries, they owe
U.S. taxes on these profits. In addition, U.S. multinationalsare typically
required to pay income and other taxes to the foreigncountries in which
they operate. Being subject to the tax authorities ofnot only their home
country (the United States) but also their host countries (e.g.,West
Germany), ordinary treatment of the profits earned abroadby U.S. multi-
nationals would subject them to double taxation. In orderto prevent the
same profits from being taxed twice, the U.S. tax system permits firms to
receive a credit for income taxes paid to othergovernments. Under the
credit system,. U.S. multinationals firstpay their foreign taxes and then
calculate the taxes they would owe to the U.S.government based on their
(pretax) worldwide income just as if all of their incomewere earned
domestically in the United States. The incometaxes paid to foreign
governments are then credited toward payment of U.S. taxes,so that taxes
otherwise owed the U.S. Treasuryare reduced dollar for dollar by taxes
paid to other governments. The practical operation ofthis credit can be
anything but straightforward, however.
To take a simple example, suppose thata U.S. manufacturing firm has a
branch in a foreign country that imposesa 20 percent tax on corporate
profits. Assume the effective tax rateon U.S. corporations to be 34 percent.
Upon earning $100 through the foreign branch, the firm willowe $20 to the
foreign government and $14 ($100 x 0.34- $20) to the U.S. government.
This calculation assumes the absence ofa number of important real-world
complications (discussed later).
United States corporations investingoverseas generally can choose from
among several forms of legal organization for these investments,an option
that complicates tax analysis, since this choicemay have dramatic tax
consequences. The primary decision facing a U.S. multinational is whether
to organize its foreign operation as a branchor as a controlled foreign
corporation (CFC).3 Branch operations are considered by U.S. lawto be
United States multinationajs can also organize their foreign affiliates with lessthan 50
percent U.S. ownership, thereby not qualifying as CFCs, but since thereare reasons not to do38Hines
integral components of the domestic U.S.corporation, so branch profits,
losses, deductions, taxes paid, and otherfinancial activities are all treated
as if performed by theU.S. corporation. Not so with CFCs, which are
legally separate entities, incorporated in host countries(e.g., West Ger-
many), and are more than 50 percent owned byU.S. shareholders, each of
which has at least 10% of the stock.4 Host countriesoften impose some-
what different tax and legal requirements on CFCsthan they do on branch
operations of U.S. multinationals. But the U.S. taxsystem treats CFCs very
differently than it does foreign branches of U.S.companies.
The most important tax distinction betweenforeign branches and CFCs
is that the United States taxes profitsof the CFCs of U.S. multinationals
only when CFCs send profits back to their U.S. parentcompanies. Legally,
CFCs are entirely separate entities fromthe U.S. parent companies that
own them, and it is onlythe U.S. parents that, strictly speaking, have tax
obligations to the U.S. government. A U.S. parentis considered to earn
income on its CFC investment onlywhen that income is returned to the
U.S. (with some exceptions). Thus, if a 100 percentAmerican-owned CFC
operates in Japan and runs up largeprofits there but does not pay out any
dividends to the American corporation that owns itsstock, then no U.S. tax
liability is generated that year. Of course,U.S. taxes on those profits may
have to be paid at some point in thefuture, if and when the profits are
ultimately repatriated to the U.S. parent corporation.
When U.S. parent companies receive dividendsfrom their CFCs, they
calculate the U.S. taxes they owe based on the incomethey receive plus the
foreign taxes credited to this income.5 The taxcredit system is designed to
treat repatriated CFC income in the same waythat an equal amount of
branch income would be treated. One legalcomplication is that when a
foreign government taxes branch income, itis the U.S. corporation that
so and they typically use CFCs, theanalysis in this paper assumes all nonbranch overseas
operations of U.S. multinationals to be CFCs.
One question that naturally arises is, what are the consequencesof less than 50 percent U.S.
ownership of a foreign corporation? If an individual corporation ownsless than 10 percent of
foreign corporation, then it is not entitled to use the foreign taxcredit when it receives taxable
dividends in the United States. On the other hand, the SubpartF restrictions apply only to
corporations that qualify as CFCs. Of course, there are anumber of nontax reasons why a
corporation might want more than 50 percent control of a foreignsubsidiary. And the foreign
corporation would presumably be less inclined to follow financialpolicies aimed at minimiz-
ing U.S. taxes of its shareholders if American firms ownless than half the shares. In practice,
in 1985 more than 75 percent of the U.S. shareof earnings and assets of foreign corporation
were located in majority-owned foreignaffiliates, which indudes foreign branches and a
subset of all CFCs (see Brereton (1987)).
The 85 percent exclusion rule, which provides that U.S.corporations are taxed on only 15
percent of the dividends they receive on their corporatestock holdings, does not apply to
dividends received from foreign corporations.Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment39
officially pays the tax, whereas incometax paid by a CFC to a foreign
government is, strictly speaking, paid by the CFC, not the U.S.corporation
that owns the CFC. To handle thissituation, the law provides that when
the U.S. parent calculates the U.S. taxes itowes on dividends received from
a CFC, the taxes paid to the foreign government by the CFCon this income
are "deemed paid" by the U.S. parent and therebycan be added to the
foreign tax credit the U.S. parent gets for foreigntaxes paid on branch
income.
When a U.S. parent corporation receives dividends froma CFC, the U.S.
parent must determine the appropriate foreign tax credit (FTC)allowable
on this income. Foreign tax credits have severalsources, the most impor-
tant being foreign withholding taxes and foreignincome taxes. Many
countries impose withholding taxeson CFC dividends remitted to U.S.
parents, and U.S. corporations are allowed to credit thesetaxes toward
their U.S. tax payments.6 It is trickier to calculate the allowabletax credit for
the income taxes paid by the CFC. The basic methodis to calculate the
fraction of the current year's after-tax CFC incomerepresented by the
dividend, and multiply that fraction by the foreigntaxes paid by the CFC
to arrive at the foreign taxes the U.S. parentcan credit toward its U.S. taxes.
Table 3 illustrates this procedure fora simple example.
In this example, a U.S. parent corporation is assumedto own 75 percent
of a foreign corporation that in the currentyear earns $5,000 in profits. The
foreign income tax rate is assumed to be 20percent, - so the CFC pays
foreign income tax of $1,000 and has $4,000 in after-taxprofits. Assume the
foreign corporation topay out 60 percent of its after-tax profits as divi-
dends, and that the foreign government imposesa 10 percent withholding
tax on dividends sent to foreign shareholders. Since the Americanparent is
entitled to 75 percent of the dividends paid out, itgets $1,800 minus the 10
percent withholding tax, or $1,620.
In calculating its U.S. tax liability, the U.S.parent is allowed to take a tax
credit for the $180 withholding tax paidon its dividend, plus a fraction of
the $1,000 paid this year by the CFC in incometaxes. The fraction is
determined by the ratio of the parent's pre-withholding-taxdividend
($1,800) to the CFC's after-tax income ($4,000), in thiscase 45%. Thus, the
U.S. parent gets a tax credit of $450 for "deemedpaid" income taxes plus
$180 for withholding taxes. But the U.S. parent is alsorequired to "gross
up" the dividend it receives from the CFC by theamount of the foreign
6Strictly speaking, though they never actuallysee the money, the U.S. parent corporations
pay these withholding taxes out of the dividends they would have received from their CFCs.
Foreign governments require the CFCs to be withholdingagents for these payments. As a
result, the U.S. parents get full tax credits for the withholdingtaxes, and the foreign
governments can lean on CFCs located in their countries to ensure that taxesare paid.40Hines
TABLE 3
Illustrative ComputationU.S. Tax Liabilityfrom Repatriated
CFC Profits
Note: This table presents the end-of-year tax calculationfor a U.S. parent company that owns 75
percent of a foreign corporation. The foreign income taxrate is assumed to be 20 percent, the foreign
government imposes a 10 percent withholding tax on dividendspaid to U.S. shareholders, and the
foreign corporation pays out 60 percent of its after-tax earnings asdividends.
taxes deemed paid, so the U.S. taxliabifity is based on $2,250 of foreign
income. At a U.S. tax rate of 34 percent,the U.S. parent owes $765 in U.S.
taxes, but it can subtract $630 in FTCsfrom this amount to yield a net
payment due the U.S. government of$135.
2.1 Some Complications
Although the FTC can be a strong palliative for theburden of foreign taxes,
there are limits to the credit's applicability. Forexample, the FTC can be
claimed only for income taxes; other types of taxespaid (or deemed paid)
to foreign governments cangenerally be deducted like other business
expenses but are not eligiblefor the credit. The distinction between foreign
income taxes and other types of foreign taxesis, for this reason, important,
but the distinction is sometimes murky. Thelaw is designed to prevent
U.S. multinationals from obtaining a U.S. taxcredit for paying user fees
disguised as foreign income taxes, but in practiceit seems that the law
disallows FTCs whenever the foreign taxes do notresemble U.S. corporate
(1)Pretax earnings of CFC
(2)Foreign income tax at 20 percent
$5,000
1,000
(3)Net earnings and profits: (1) - (2) 4,000
(4)Dividend paid to all shareholders: 60% of (3), byassumption 2,400
(5)Dividend paid to U.S. parent company: 75% of (4),by
assumption 1,800
(6)Foreign withholding tax at 10%: 10% of (5)




Direct credit for withholding tax 180
Deemed paid credit for subsidiary's income tax:
[(5)1(3)] x (2) 450
(8)Total creditable taxes 630
Includable as U.S. income:
Dividend received 1,800
Foreign deemed paid tax 450
(9)Total grossed-up foreign dividend
(10) U.S. tax due: 34% of (9)
2,250
765
(11) Foreign tax credit 630
(12) Net payment due U.S. government: (10) -(11) 135Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment41
income taxes.7 On the other hand, withholding taxes on dividend remit-
tances generally qualify as creditable income taxes, since they are attributed
to be "in lieu of" income taxes that foreigners would have paid to theirown
governments had they been the shareholders.
In addition, there is an overall limit to the FTC: the law stipulates thata
firm cannot apply more FTCs toward its U.S. tax liabffity than the total of
its foreign source income times the average U.S. tax rate itpays. The FTC
limitation is designed to enforce the restriction that FTCs cannot be usedto
offset taxes due on domestic U.S. income. That part of foreign taxes paidat
a rate higher than the U.S. rate cannot be used as a tax credit in the current
year. Since 1976, the U.S. government has required U.S. multinationals to
average their worldwide foreign income and foreign taxes for purposes of
calculating taxes and credits. This requirement limits the abffity of U.S.
firms to reduce their taxable income through foreign losses, but it allows
firms to get credits for taxes paid in high-tax foreign countries by averaging
with operations in low-tax countries. The slight nonlinearity of the U.S.
corporate tax rate also affects the FTC limit, since the limit is basedon
average rather than marginal rates. Under the pre-TRA the U.S. corporate
tax rate started at 15 percent and became 46 percent only oncea corporation
had income of $100,000; furthermore, capital gainswere taxed at 28
percent. Hence, a corporation that had much of its income in capital gains
or that had low profits (or better yet, losses) would have an average tax rate
below 46 percent and could credit only those foreign taxes that didnot
exceed this rate.
The structure of the FTC mechanism means that tax timing issues loom
large for some U.S. multinationals, particularly those with substantial
variations in foreign and domestic income. If a U.S. multinational cannot
use all of its FTCs currently, it is permitted to carry them back up to two
years or forward up to five years to reduce U.S. tax obligations on eligible
foreign source income. Indeed, there isa significant inventory of unused
FTCs that U.S. corporations carry forward each year.8
Another complication arises when CFCspay out dividends exceeding
their current year's income. In that event, theexcess of current dividends
over current income is attributed to previous years' undistributed incomes
in reverse order, last year first. Firms are required, in other words, to keep
For example, certain foreign oil income taxes based on "posted price" rather than market
revenues were disqualified as income taxes. McDaniel and Ault (1981) contains a discussion
of this issue.
8For example, U.S. corporations carried accumulated FTCs of $17.5 billion forward into 1982
while acquiring an additional $20.7 billion credit that year. Only $18.9 billion of those FTCs
could be used in 1982, the bulk of the difference presumably eligible to be carried forward into
future years. (See Barlow (1986) for 1982 data.)42Hines
inventories of each year's income and dividends, reducingthe inventories
in last-infirst-out fashion as future dividendsexceed future earnings.
Given this accounting system, it is in the interest ofU.S. multinationals that
do not bump up against the FTC limit to receive dividendsselectively from
those of their CFCs having higher-than-average foreign tax years.Indeed,
CFCs may reduce their overall tax burdens by taking actionsthat raise their
average foreign tax burdens but at the sametime increase their variability
so that dividends can be paid inhigh-tax years. Industry sources suggest
that firms make widespread use of this so-called"rhythm method" of
paying dividends. The TRA limited (but did not eliminate)the abifity of
U.S. corporations to profit from year-to-year fluctuations intheir CFCs'
average foreign tax rates by providingthat all post-1986 CFC earnings and
foreign taxes be pooled to construct a multiple-year averageforeign tax rate
for purposes of calculating the indirect FTC.
Confident in the ability of U.S. corporations to exploitopportunities for
tax avoidance, the U.S. Congress has writteninto the law a number of
provisions that trigger tax obligations of U.S. parent companiesfor certain
actions taken by their CFCs. The most important suchprovisions are the
Subpart F rules, which were adopted in 1962. Theserules attempt to
discourage U.S. parents of CFCs from indefinitely delayingthe repatriation
of CFC income if minimizing U.S. taxes were thegoal behind their
no-dividend strategy.
The Subpart F rules provide that certain types of CFCexpenditures or
investments will be treated as if they were dividend paymentsto the U.S.
parent, and hence wifi increase the U.S. taxobligation of the parent
company. The most important categoryof these financial activities is
passive investments. Thus, the profits of a U.S.multinational's French CFC
are not taxable by the U.S. ifreinvested in the French business, but the
same profits if invested by thenonbank CFC in French bonds earn interest
that is taxable in the United States as earned.
The Subpart F rules generally prevent nonfinancial CFCsfrom making
financial investments in lieu of returning dividends to theUnited States.
Besides passive investment income, Subpart F requires CFCinvestments in
U.S. property and insurance of U.S. risks to be taxable asif the money were
repatriated to the U.S. parent. Various earnings byCFCs in countries
outside their host country trigger Subpart F tax liabffities, asdo foreign
ifiegal payments and income earned in countries that engagein certain
illegal boycotts. Once the U.S. parent incurs a tax liabffitythrough Subpart
F, however, the Subpart F income can be repatriated tothe United States
without any further U.S. tax consequences.
The taxation of foreign source income raises issues that are notpresent or
are less important to domestic businesstaxation. For example, the alloca-Taxation and U. S. Multinational Investment43
hon of income between countries can havevery large tax consequences for
U.S. multinationals. It is generally in the interest of multinationalsto earn
their income in low-tax jurisdictions. (Although,once earned, multination-
als have incentives to attribute income to high-taxsources for FTC pur-
poses.) Thus it might be tempting for U.S. multinationalstosell
intermediate products to their foreign affiliates located in tax havens,at
bargain prices, and to locate the head office andas many companywide
fixed expenditures as possible in high-tax countries. But U.S. lawgenerally
requires firms to use market prices (or the equivalent) for intracompany
transfers and to allocate fixed costs according to formulas basedon criteria
such as sales and assets. The law also restrictseven the tax location of some
assets; for example, income earned by Americans in outerspace or in
Antarctica is taxed as though earned on the ground in the UnitedStates.9
Other features of the tax law applying to foreignsource income include
much less generous investment incentives than those givento domestic
capital until the recent tax reform. Foreign investmentsare not eligible for
the investment tax credit and must be depreciated fortax purposes over
long lifetimes. Special rules apply to foreign oil andgas income, and there
are special recapture provisions that recoup in subsequent years tax losses
that are usually associated with those industries. More generally,the TRA
requires various baskets of foreign earningsources to keep separate
accounts in hopes of preventing high foreign tax income, suchas that
derived from petroleum, from pooling tax credits with low foreigntax
income from other sources. Other significant changes includedin the tax
reform include the introduction of functional currencies forforeign affil-
iates. Before passage of the TRA, the lawwas unclear over the appropriate
way to treat for tax purposes changes in the value of foreign affiliates
resulting from exchange rate movements. Under current law,each foreign
affiliate chooses (usually) one functionalcurrency and earns taxable income
only for transactions in that currency.
2.2 Implications for Investment Behavior
The most striking features of U.S. taxation of multinationalincome are the
provisions for credit and deferral. From a static and purely self-interested
perspective, it may be hard to understand why the U.S.government
permits a tax credit for foreign taxes paid. Taking the tax systems of foreign
governments as given, foreign taxes paid by U.S. companiesare costs of
doing business and nothing more. As such,one might expect the U.S.
government to permit a U.S. tax deduction for foreign taxes paid; buta
credit goes beyond that. The FTC mitigates the doubletaxation of U.S.
Special rules apply to communications sateffites.44Hines
multinationals on their foreign earnings but does so by allowingforeign
governments to extract tax revenues from U.S. companieswithout fear of
excessively discouraging U.S. investment within theirborders, since the
cost is borne largely by the U.S. Treasury. Infact, even a tax deduction for
foreign taxes paid might represent too generous a policy, sinceif American
capital as a whole has market power overseas the U.S. governmentcould
create rents by taxing multinational investments(relative to allowing a
deduction), restricting the quantity of American investmentsand raising
their returns. But neither of these alternativesa tax deductionfor foreign
taxes paid or only a partial deduction (or tax)maymake sense if other
countries are thereby encouraged to adopt sinviar policies intaxing the
U.S. investments of their own multinationals. All countries canbe worse
off in a worldwide regime of heavy double taxationof multinational
income. The FTC is probably best understood as a measuredesigned to
preserve an international politicalequilibrium of limited multinational
taxes.
The deferral of U.S. taxes on unrepatriated CFC incomefurther encour-
ages U.S. investment abroad. By reinvestingtheir foreign CFC earnings in
active investments in foreign host countries, where tax rates arelower than
the U.S. tax rate, U.S. multinationals can effectively earn interestabroad on
what would have been taxes due to the U.S. government.Even though
U.S. taxes are ultimately due on all foreign earnings,firms are generally
better off by delaying their U.S. tax payments. Hencedeferral has two
consequences: it may encourageinitial equity investments by U.S. parents
in their foreign CFCs, since the returns are lightlytaxed, and CFCs have
particularly strong incentives to invest out of retained earnings, sincethose
funds are subject to U.S. tax if not reinvested.
The deferral of U.S. taxes is widely thought to havesubstantial effects on
CFC investment behavior. Horst (1977) argues thatdeferral lowers (in the
case of a U.S. tax rate that ishigher than foreign taxes) the effective tax rate
on CFC investments to aweighted average of U.S. and foreign tax rates,
with weights deteuidned by the CFC's (fixed)dividend payout ratio.
Hartman (1985) argues that deferral is even morepowerful than that: he
claims that the reinvestment decisions of matureCFCs will be completely
unaffected by U.S. tax considerations. Newlon (1987) arrives at the same
conclusion, using a model that includes the full rangeof financial options
available to the multinational firm. In the Hartman andNewlon models the
U.S. tax system can affect only the initial equity investmentsof U.S.
multinationals overseas. Once firms have sufficient retained earnings
abroad, they finance their own investments out of these earnings asif the
U.S. tax rate on this income were zero. Assumingforeign tax rates to be
lower than U.S. rates, CFCs of U.S. multinationalswifi therefore reinvestTaxation and U.S. Multinational Investment45
their earnings to a greater degree than would those companiesin the
United States. Hartman (1981), Frisch and Hartman (1983), and Boskinand
Gale (1987) tested whether domestic tax variables affect foreign investment
by U.S. multinationals out of retained earnings and foundno significant
effect. But these regressions encounter difficulties acknowledged bythe
authors, and in section 5 explores channels through which U.S.taxes affect
CFC reinvestment decisions that the earlier studies do not incorporate.
United States companies are not the only entities whose behavioris
likely to be affected by U.S. provisions for taxing the foreign income ofU.S.
multinationals. Foreign governments may respond,or threaten to respond,
in a retaliatory fashion to aggressive U.S. tax increases. The worldwide
averaging provision of the U.S. tax code mayencourage some high-tax
countries to raise their taxes on U.S. multinationals in order to free ride off
other, low-tax, countries where U.S. multinationals generate income.In
addition, foreign governments have incentives to design theirtax systems
to show a high rate of income tax that is eligible for the U.S. FTC. As
Gersovitz (1987) argues, the optimal strategy fora host country often is to
tax multinationals at a high rate while offering other director indirect
investment subsidies, thereby encouraging investment and allowing U.S.
firms to claim hefty FTCs. Baldwin (1986) reports that indirect subsidies for
multinational investment are quite common, including U.S.government
subsidies for foreign investment projects in the United States.
3. HOW BIG ARE U.S. TAXES?
Much of the preceding discussion was predicatedon the assumption that
the U.S. tax rate on foreign source income exceeds foreign taxrates. If the
U.S. tax rate exactly equalled foreign tax rates, then the U.S.tax system
would raise no revenue from foreign sources and haveno effect on the
overseas behavior of U.S. multinationals. Unfortunately, it is not easy to
construct summary statistics on the difference between U.S. and foreigntax
rates, since applicable statutory tax rates as well as depreciation and other
provisions vary widely from one country to another.
Table 4 presents some evidence on the relative historic magnitudes of
average foreign and U.S. tax rates on foreign source income of U.S.
multinationals. Of course, these tax rates represent tax collectionsas a
fraction of realized taxable income and so do not reflectmany of the tax
incentives that affect investor decisions by encouraging lightly taxed
activities and discouraging business activities taxed at full rates. In addi-
tion, these figures do not incorporate unreported foreign income of U.S.
firms or the incentives generated by the tax system toearn foreign income























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment47
presents a picture of foreign tax rates that are slightly lower than the
average U.S. corporate tax rate. As a result, U.S. taxes have generally been
due on foreign income received by U.S. corporations, though ata fairly low
average rate.
What does the evidence in Table 4 suggest about the likely effect of U.S.
taxes on overseas investments by U.S. multinationals? Since tax collections
on foreign source income are positive, it is tempting to infer that firms must
pay positive U.S. taxes on repatriated profits, a tax obligation they can defer
by continued reinvestment abroad. One difficulty in drawing that conclu-
sion is that, once again, these tax rates reflect average rather than marginal
incentives for a firm's foreign investment. In addition, these numbers
represent averages across firms and countries. It may be that the CFCs of
individual firms located in particular countries facevery high or very low
effective tax rates on their marginal investments. The TRA, with the
reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate from 46 to 34 percent, is also likely
to change the relative sizes of U.S. and foreign tax rates. United States taxes
on multinational investment can be expected to diminish in importance;
Grubert and Mutti (1987) report Treasury estimates that 70percent of U.S.
manufacturing companies will have excess FTCs.
Even if the U.S. Treasury collected no corporaterevenue at all from
foreign source income, it would be a mistake to conclude that U.S.taxes
have no effect on foreign investment behavior of U.S. multinationals. As
discussed in the previous section, the U.S. tax systemmay induce U.S.
multinationals to reduce their U.S. tax liabffities by adjusting therate at
which they pay out dividends, by modifying theiruse of tax deductions in
foreign countries, and by changing the location ofoverseas investments, all
of which have real effects on the after-tax returns available from invest-
ments in other countries. Consider the simple case in whicha U.S.
corporation wants to repatriate some of the income earned byone of its
CFCs located in a foreign countly with very high taxes. Taken alone, the
dividend payment would generate no additional U.S. tax liability, since the
associated FTCs exceed the average U.S. taxes that would have to be paid.
But by generating foreign tax in excess of the credit limit, thisaction
encourages the same U.S. parent company to repatriate income from CFCs
located in low-tax countries, since worldwide averaging permits theU.S.
parent to apply the high foreign taxes to the rest of its repatriated income
that year and bring the average down to the limit. This technique thereby
removes some of the repatriation disincentive for investments in low-tax
countries and may contribute to the popularity of tax havens as investment
locations. One implication of widespreaduse of this technique would be
average realized foreign tax rates on repatriated income near the U.S.48Hines
statutory corporate rate, and low average U.S. tax rates onrepatriated
income, both of which one observes.
None of this should be taken to minimize the importanceof interfirm
heterogeneity in applicable marginal tax rates on foreign investmentsand
repatriations to the United States. Some firms carry forwardunused FTCs
each year, whereas other firms pay substantial taxes on theirforeign source
income. Although a similar tale can be told of the unused taxcredits and
deductions of unprofitable domestic U.S. firms going to wastewhile other
U.S. firms face full tax rates (see Auerbach and Poterba (1987)),the rules
that apply to foreign source income make it particularlydifficult for unused
FTCs to find their way into the books of companies that canexploit them.
Without tax data on individual firms one cannot knowprecisely their
incentives, but it is stifi possible to make some general observationsabout
the average tax incentives U.S. firms face. The next questionis whether
observed behavior is consistent with those incentives.
4. FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR AND TAXINCENTIVES
Because profits earned abroad by the CFCs of U.S. multinationals are not
subject to U.S. taxation until received by their U.S. parents, it is tothe
advantage of these CFCs to delay paying dividends as long asfeasible,
thereby reducing the present value of the associated U.S. tax obligations. In
fact, one well might wonder why CFCs remit dividends to U.S. parents at
all, given the tax cost of doing so. A similar question arises in studiesof the
financial behavior of domestic U.S. corporations, since individualswho
own corporate stock are typicallytaxed much more heavily on the divi-
dends they receive than on their capital gains. Hence, shareholdersshould
prefer their companies to reinvest all their profits, in government bonds if
necessary, rather than pay dividends. Byreinvesting the profits, the
companies would raise the value of their shares and shareholderscould
take their returns in the form of lower-taxed shareappreciation rather than
dividends. Or less subtly, corporations can and do return profits to
stockholders in lightly taxed form through share repurchases, as Shoven
(1987) documents.
In fact, domestic U.S. corporations pay out about one-quarter to one-
third of their profits to their shareholders each year in dividends, as
indicated in the first column of Table 5. By contrast, colunm 3 of Table 5
reveals CFCs to payout a significantly higher fractionalmosthalfof
their annual profits out in dividends each year. The accountingrules
underlying these ratios are somewhat arbitrary (see Poterba (1987) for a
discussion), but they reveal what appears to be a significant difference in
the financial behavior of domestic corporations and their CFCs. In order toTaxation and U. S. Multinational Investment49
TABLE 5
CFC Dividend Payouts and U.S. Corporate Dividend Payouts
Note: First and second columns adapted form Poterba (1987).
Sources: Author's calculation based on data in U.S. Department of the Treasury (various) and States
(1980-1987). Some CFC data refer only to CFCs whose U.S. parent corporations have assets of at least
$250 million.
understand the source of this difference, it helps to explore the reasons
why firms pay dividends in the first place. Financial policy is particularly
important to the investment decisions of CFCs, since the Subpart F and
other rules imply that the tradeoff between dividends and investments in
plant and equipment is even stronger for them than it is for domestic firms.
Observers of U.S. corporate financial policy have proposed several expla-
nations for the presence of significant dividend payments despite associated
tax costs. The most important of these explanations indude the use of
dividend payouts by a firm's managers to signal profitabffity, the willingness
of tax-exempt and certain other shareholders to receive dividends rather than
accrue capital gains, and the possibffity that a reinvested dollar may not raise
firm value by a full dollar. The first explanation relieson incompleteness of
information flows between firms and their shareholders. By paying divi-
dends, firms reassure their shareholders and the market generally that
operations continue to be profitable. By contrast, a reduction in dividends
signals pessimistic news about current and future profitabifity and is likely to
depress firm value. Since publidy traded American firmsare required to
release their financial information to the public, dividends under the signaling
interpretation must be conveying information beyond that which firms rou-
tinely make available through annual reports, 10-K filings, and the like.10
The second explanation for dividend payouts by firms to shareholders is
the possibffity that tax-exempt shareholders hold the stock of high-payout
'° Gordon and Malkiel (1981) explore the consequences of this view of dividend behavior.
1982 30.6 24.8 64.8 6.8
1980 23.9 30.5 45.3 17.5
1978 22.3 28.7 n.a. 4.6
1976 24.2 28.6 44.2 6.4
1974 28.7 28.2 51.8 19.8












corporations %dividends %ratio, CFCs % earnings %50Hines
firms, making those payouts costless from a tax point of view.Then if
shareholders would have to incur transactions costs in selling stock, those
shareholders would prefer to receive their returns in the form of dividends
rather than capital gains. In addition, corporate shareholders canexclude
from their taxable income 85 percent of the dividends they receivefrom
domestic corporations, so they generally prefer to receive dividendsrather
than capital gains.1'
The third explanation of dividend behavior is the so-called"trapped
money" model: once a corporation earns money, it must chooseeither to
pay the money out as a dividend or toreinvest the money. Since
corporations are observed to pay some dividends, this modelimplies that
a marginal dollar reinvested in the firmproduces the sameafter-taxaddition
to shareholder value as would the same dollarpaid as a dividend.
Assuming tax rates on capital gains to be lower than dividend taxes, it must
be the case that $1 of marginal investment financed by reinvestedearnings
is sufficiently unproductive that it raises firm value by lessthan$1.12
Although none of these three models of firm financial policy appear to
explain every feature of domestic dividend behavior, it isworth consider-
ing how they can be applied to the dividend remittancedecisions of CFCs
of U.S. multinationals. At first blush, it seems unlikely that informationand
signaling problems would arise between CFCs and their U.S. multinational
parents, since it is all one company and the parent could inprinciple demand
to see detailed financial records, fire foreign managers,and exert control in
other ways. Furthermore, the U.S. parent as (in manycases) the only
shareholder need not be troubled by temporary changes in share value. But at
the same time, one cannot rule out the same kind of agencyproblems that
arise between ordinary corporate shareholders and theirfirm's managers.
Domestic managers of U.S. multinationals inevitably have lessinformation
about the financial well-being of foreign affffiates than dotheir foreign
managers, and continued high-dividend payoutsprovide convincing evi-
dence of the high quality of overseas operations. But thiseffect seems unlikely
to explain payout ratios that exceed even those ofdomestic corporations.
The second explanation for domestic dividends, the presenceof low-tax
shareholder cienteles, says little about dividend remittances toheavily
taxed multinationals. But the third explanation, that corporate moneyis
11Auerbach (1983a) finds some support in data on stock price movements for thehypothesis
that low-tax shareholders tend to own stock in firms with highdividend-payout ratios, but
even in his estimates these individuals prefercapital gains to dividends.
12See Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and King (1977) for the developmentof this model.
Poterba and Summers (1985) do not find support for this theory in their recent examinationof
U.K. data.Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment51
"trapped" within inescapable tax barriers,appears to be very much to the
point of multinational financial planning. Whatcan a CFC do with its
earnings when there appear to be no profitable foreign investmentoppor-
tunities? The Subpart F rules prevent passive and other types of interna-
tionally invested income from going unrecognized by the U.S.tax system,
so dividends to parent companies entail no extra tax cost to the multina-
tional. Of course, these dividends then represent income that the U.S.
parent corporation must either reinvest or pay out as dividends to its
shareholders. The profits of CFCs are thus subject to taxation threetimes:
they are taxed by foreign governments when earned, by the U.S.govern-
ment when repatriated, and by the U.S. government when distributed
ultimately to stockholders. But CFCs cannot avoid indefinitely the lasttwo
layers of taxation, and so should be expected to remit dividendsin
response to declining foreign uses of capital.'3
Controlled foreign corporations need notpay dividends mechanically,
however: the model implies that payout ratios should be sensitiveto the
associated U.S. tax obligations, and the evidence suggests that theyare.
Recall from Table 5 that CFC payout ratiosare higher than overall U.S.
corporate ratios, which is consistent with the lower average U.S. tax rateon
CFC dividends than on domestic corporate dividends paid to individual
shareholders. In addition, CFC payout ratiosvary over time and between
CFCs as the U.S. taxes due on CFC dividendsvary. Table 6 illustrates the
response of payouts to taxes with aggregate CFC data for 1980 and 1982. All
other things equal, CFCs facing the highest foreign taxes have incentivesto
pay dividends at the highest rates, since these dividends may be untaxed
by the U.S. government and, indeed, through worldwide averaging these
dividends might reduce U.S. taxes due on foreignsource income that was
lightly taxed by foreign governments. The last column of Table 6suggests
that payout ratios do generally rise with foreign tax rates. This evidence is
consistent with other findings that the dividend policies of multinational
firms respond to foreign and U.S. tax regimes.
13 One implication of the model is that CFCs thatpay dividends should never simultaneously
receive equity transfers from their parents. Jun (1987) presents new evidence thatmore than
a quarter of foreign affiliates pay dividends and receive transfers in the same year. But these
data do not condusively reject the theory, since the sample includes branchesas well as CFCs,
the transfers include debt as well as equity, and the timing of financial operations within the
year may be important here. Furthermore, under the current system of worldwide averaging,
U.S. parents desire immediate repatriation of profits earned by their CFCs located incountries
with taxes higher than U.S. rates, replenishing them if necessary with equity transfers in the
same year. The presence of CFCs in high-tax countries may account for Jun's findings.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AND U.S.INVESTMENT
ABROAD
The tax incentive for U.S. firms to invest abroad is asubject of major policy
interest. As earlier discussion indicates, anyindividual firm's tax incentives
depend on its available tax credit carryforwards, earnings,and tax history
against which to carry back deductions and credits,fungibiity of current-
year dividend repatriationsfrom CFCs in high- and low-tax countries,
borrowing opportunities, and a host of other factors.In addition, when
new investment opportunities arise,they can be exploited in a number of
different forms.
United States multinationals can choose from amongthree primary
methods of investing in foreign countries: branchinvestments, CFC
investments financed out of new transfers of debt or equityfrom the parent
corporation, and CFC investments financed out ofretained earnings. Since
it is not clear with which of these methods marginalmultinational invest-
ments take place, it is necessary to analyzethe investment tax incentives for
all three.
Foreign branch investments are seemingly the moststraightforward,
since repatriation-timing issues do not arisebecause branches are taxed
currently in the U.S. on all their earnings and profits. Asmentioned earlier,
the U.S. tax treatment of foreign branches differsfrom the tax treatment of
analogous domestic U.S. investment in that branches must paytaxes to
foreign governments at rates possibly higher thanU.S. tax rates, and
branches are not entitled to some domestic investment incentivessuch as
the investment tax credit and short asset lifetimesfor tax depreciation
purposes. One big tax advantage thatbranch organization may offer a U.S.
multinational is that foreign branch losses reduce domestictaxable profits
dollar for dollar. Since U.S. multinationals are notpermitted to use CFC
losses to reduce domestic or foreign taxableincome, it may be in the
interest of firms expecting loss years to organizetheir foreign operations as
branches. It is widely argued that the tax lossesassociated with oil and
natural gas exploration and development motivated U.S.oil companies to
form foreign branches rather than CFCs for their overseasoperations.
Naturally, legal, regulatory, and political considerations also mayaffect the
decision to form a foreign branch rather than a CFC.
New investments financed out of the retained earningsof existing CFCs
have the tax advantage of avoiding direct U.S.taxation of either the
principal or subsequent profits until profits are repatriated.It is this feature
that motivated Hartman (1985) to argue that only theforeign country's tax
system affects the marginal incentive forCFCs to invest out of retainedTaxation and U.S. Multinational Investment55
earnings. Although Hartman's conclusion is correct for the stylizedmodel
he constructs, it is not accurate to conclude that U.S. CFCswith retained
earnings face no marginal investment incentives from the U.S.tax code. In
particular, the difference between the U.S. definition of foreignearnings
and profits and the foreign definition of taxable income generallyproduces
a tax burden on U.S. multinational investment in excess of the foreign
effective tax rate.
No two foreign tax systems look exactly alike; however, theytypically
share the feature that they encourage corporate investmentthrough
incentives such as very rapid tax write-off of depreciation charges fornew
investments. Canada, for example, hasvery generous investment incen-
tives in the manufacturing industries. When U.S. multinationalsmake
investments through their CFCs, they must calculate theirearnings and
profits based on "U.S. accounting principles," which provide,among other
things, for tax depreciation of investmentexpenses at slow rates over long
depreciable lifetimes. As a result, a new U.S. investment inCanada
generates a present value of U.S.-definition earnings and profits that is
higher than the present value of Canadian-defined taxable income.
This difference in U.S. and foreign definitions of income, along withthe
method by which tax credits are computed,means that the U.S. corporate
tax rate and U.S. rules for depreciation of foreign property generally
combine to discourage even the marginal investments of U.S.-owned CFCs
that use retained earnings. The reason the U.S. tax system hasthis effect is
that a new CFC investment will in general change the calculatedvalue of a
firm's average foreign tax rate that is used in the tax creditcomputation. As
a result, even though the profits from a new CFC investmentmay not be
themselves subject to U.S. taxation, the accounting rules work insuch a
way that this investment reduces the FTC the U.S. parent firm is eligible to
take on profits from other foreign investments made by thesame CFC, as
long as the tax rate on marginal investments is lower than theaverage tax
rate paid that year. A complete calculation of the true tax incentives for CFC
investments should include this effect along with the standardtax incentive
provided by foreign law.
By defining foreign income in this way, the U.S. tax law discourages U.S.
overseas investments in countries with significantly different income defi-
nitions. It is difficult to establish in practice exactly how muchof a
difference these accounting rules make in the level of reportedearnings,
but Table 7 provides some suggestion that the differencemay be quite
substantial. As the table reports, the measured profit marginson sales by
CFCs of U.S. multinationals are consistently significantly higherthan profit
margins of all U.S. corporations. To be sure, these higher profit margins
undoubtedly also reflect the different natures of domestic and multinational56Hines
TABLE 7
Profit Margins of CFCs and All U.S.Corporations Compared
Controlled Foreign Corporations Profit
Current margins of
earnings and all U.S.
Business profits before Profit corporations
receipts taxes margin (%) (%)
1982 $647.9 $36.7 5.66 3.51
1980 699.0 47.6 6.81 4.17
1976 342.8 23.5 6.85 5.50
1974 281.3 20.9 7.44 5.11
1972 172.4 15.4 8.91 4.82
Note: Dollar amounts are billions of current dollars.
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury (1985) andSimenauer (1986).
businesses, the efforts of U.S. multinationals totransfer at reduced prices their
high-profit assets to CFCs and away from U.S. taxing jurisdiction,and other
business activities of multinationals. Furthermore, it is notobvious how one is
to interpret evidence on profit margins, sincefirms try to maximize profits
rather than their margins. Given the limited financialdata available, however,
the size of CFC profit margins as measured byU.S. accounting principles
suggests that use of these principles may substantially overstateCFC profits
(relative to the U.S. definition) and, by extension, reduce U.S.multinational
tax credits and discourage CFC reinvestment.
Table 8 presents calculations of adjusted effective tax ratesfor invest-
ments made out of retained earnings by CFCsof U.S. multinationals in
selected industrial countries in 1982.' Column 4 contains estimatesof
effective tax rates for reinvested CFC earnings without correctingfor the
U.S. definition of foreign income. These effective tax rates arebasically the
same as those faced by foreign firmsreinvesting in their own countries.
Colunm 5 presents corrected effective tax rates for U.S. CFCs. Withthe
exception of West Germany, the corrected effective tax rates are higherthan
the uncorrected rates, significantly so in Canada and the UnitedKingdom
where the governments offer very fast depreciation write-offs on new
capital as investment incentives. By contrast, West Germany insists on
slow capital cost recovery so the U.S. tax system encouragesinvestment
there relative to the incentives faced by West German firms.
These effective tax rate calculations are based on the same assumptions
Among these countries, the United Kingdom has significantly changedits taxation of





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































embodied in Auerbach's (1983b) estimates of effective tax rates on U.S.
domestic investment: firms choose accounting policies to minimize taxes,
and investors require 4 percent real after-tax returns. For these estimates,
inflation expectations are assumed to be static, firms invest in asset
combinations similar to aggregate U.S. corporate investment, and these
assets depreciate at the same rates as those assumed byAuerbach for the
United States. In addition, the average realized U.S. tax rate on foreign
income is assumed to be 10 percent, and the average dividend payout ratio
on the CFC's other investments isassumed to be 50 percent. Though
stylized, these assumptions correspond to observed average behaviorof
U.S. CFCs.16 Foreign tax parameters are based on data from Price Water-
house (various), where when necessary values were chosen which corre-
spond most closely to the foreign tax treatment of new manufacturing
investment. Given the special tax provisions affecting other important
industries, it probably makes the most sense to interpret these effective tax
rates as applying primarily to manufacturing firms. Assuch, they can be
compared to effective tax rates of around 25 percent, which Auerbach
(1983b) estimates for domestic U.S. manufacturing investment in 1982. The
adjusted effective tax rates on foreign investments are uniformly higher.
It is instructive to associate the investment/capital ratios incolumn 3 of
Table 8 with the corresponding effective tax rates. In a first pass there
appears to be little correlation: Japan andBrazil exhibit the highest
investment ratios without having the lowest effective tax rates. ButJapan's
adjusted effective tax rate is the second lowest, and the table may ifiustrate
the importance of adjusting foreign effective tax rates to account for the
effects of U.S. taxes. Without doing so, Canada and the United Kingdom
show by far the lowest effective tax rates, and their 1982 investment ratios
suggest that such investment incentives may be absent. In fact,the wedge
between domestic effective tax rates and the effective tax rate on foreign
investment may partly account for lagging foreign investmentbehavior.
Naturally, it is a mistake to infer too much from one year's worth of
investment and tax data. This is particularly true when different typesof
investments face different tax rates, and Table 8 presents dataonly on the
tax rates on CFC profits reinvested in manufacturing(though other tax
rates should move more or less in tandem). Unfortunately, onehas few
options in this case. Table 8 presents data for 1982 because it is theonly
recent year for which the U.S. Commerce Department has detailed survey
16Of course, these calculations ifiustrate that marginal investment incentives are sensitive to
a firm's average foreign tax rate, and these tax rates differwidely. The reported numbers are
based on overall average foreign tax rates, but these may not be the average foreign tax rates
of marginal investors.Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment59
data on U.S. multinationals. The multinational investment and tax picture
is likely to look very different with the U.S. passage of the TRA and the
excess FTCs it generates. Furthermore, U.S. domestic tax incentives were
largely removed by the Act, and it remains to be seen whether U.S.
multinationals are thereby encouraged to move more of their operations
and investments abroad.
6. CONCLUSION
Taxes have historically played an important role in influencing multinational
investment decisions. Although the consequences of the incentives offered by
tax havens are plainly visible, the effect of U.S. taxes on the foreign invest-
ments of American multinationals maybe no less real. Contrary to the claims
of earlier authors, the U.S. tax system appears to have had a significant
influence on marginal after-tax returns available to investors in foreign assets.
There are several channels for this influence of the U.S. tax system. The
U.S. tax code defines income differently than do foreign governments for
their own tax purposes, which has generally worked to discourage U.S.
multinational investments in countries with strong investment incentives.
The potential tax obligation due the U.S. government on repatriation of
foreign earnings has influenced multinational financial policy, encouraging
firms to pay dividends from high-tax sources and retain earnings (thereby
investing) in low-tax countries. The generally heavy taxation of U.S.
individual shareholders on dividends encourages U.S. corporations to
retain earnings to a greater degree than they would otherwise, and foreign
affifiates of U.S. multinationals should be subject to the same incentive.
Finally, though not explored here, U.S. taxes may affect the profitability of
overseas investments by U.S. multinationals through influencing the rate
of accumulation of complementary capital in the United States.
The TRA appears to change many of these incentives. By reducing the
U.S. tax rate, the Act all but relieves most U.S. multinationals of U.S. tax
obligations on their foreign income. But time wifi tell what the long-run
effects of tax reform will be on multinational investment. Possibly much of
the effect will depend on the reaction of foreign governments to U.S. tax
changes, a process that is difficult to predict and still appears to be evolving.
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